The article examines the views of the top leadership of Japan on the degree of military threat to Russia in 1895-1916. The author concludes about the decisive influence of the fears of the Japanese Empire government about a military clash with Russia on the process of developing and implementing the foreign policy of this island state in this period. The main reasons for this were the presence of mutual territorial claims to neighbouring Manchuria and Korea in 1895–1903, the growth of the grouping of troops of the Tsarist army beyond Lake Baikal in response to the aggravation of relations with Japan from 1896 which lasted until 1914, the influence of Russian–British and Japanese- American contradictions. Therefore, since 1902, the Japanese government has been laying the basis for the defense strategy and foreign policy of the assumption of an inevitable military conflict with Russia, where Tokyo was either a victim of aggression or forced to deliver a preemptive strike on the side. In accordance with their ideas about the aggressive nature of Russian foreign policy, in 1895–1903 and in 1907–1914, the military and political leadership of the empire adopted and implemented programs for the development of the Armed Forces aimed at achieving military parity with Russia in the Far East. Nevertheless, after the Russian-Japanese war, the Imperial Navy began to increasingly declare the need to consider not only Russia, but also America as the main enemy. The final settlement of all disputed issues between St. Petersburg and Tokyo occurred only after the signing of secret agreements on the division of spheres of influence on the continent in 1907–1912, and the transfer of Tsarist troops from the Far East to the West in 1914–1915 and Russia's support of Japanese claims to German colonies in China at the beginning of the First World War led to the formation of the Russian-Japanese military bloc in 1916.